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ABSTRACT 
In recent years Lebanon’s Hizbullah, the Party of God, has been steadily 
increasing its influence both domestically and in Middle East politics regionally. 
Hizbullah has transformed itself from a radical militia opposing Israeli occupation into a 
mainstream political party. In the process, Hizbullah has followed a sophisticated media 
strategy which includes a satellite television station with region reach.  
This thesis examines how Hizbullah has used the media to build its popular base 
and achieve political goals. Using elements of social movement theory (SMT), this paper 
will analyze how Hizbullah’s messages through the media have evolved in relation to 
political events occurring during three time periods. First, from the parliamentary 
elections in 1992 to the Israeli withdrawal in 2000; second, from post-Israeli withdrawal 
to the July 2006 war; finally, from the end of the July war to the present. Alternatively, 
this argument will be compared against theories that Islamist movements are unique and 
not responsive to the dynamics of social movements.  
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Lebanon has had a long history of foreign intervention and is home to various 
religious and ethnic groups. In the early 1980s, Islamist groups in Lebanon emerged and 
have seen its organizations grow in response to conditions affecting the region.1 One such 
group is Hizbullah, the Party of God, which is comprised of Shia Muslims. Although 
labeled as a terrorist organization by the United States, political restructuring and 
transformation was initiated by leaders within Hizbullah in order to integrate itself 
socially and politically into Lebanon’s multi-confessional and secular society.2 No 
official census has been taken since 1932; however, Shia Muslims represent an estimated 
38% of Lebanon’s population.3 
Hizbullah has managed to increase it constituency by promoting a Muslim 
community and offering social services to the poor areas of Lebanon. In the 1992 
Parliamentary elections, Hizbullah and its non- Shia allies took 12 seats out of the 128 
seat chamber, including eight Shia seats.4 Hizbullah’s use of framing in media reflects 
the cultural and ideological components of politics which is important for interpreting the 
grievances and reasons for mobilization. This thesis will study the relationship of media 
to a movement and question whether changes in framing correlate to changes in political 
circumstances.  
B. HIZBULLAH AND ISLAMIST GROUPS 
Recent books and articles on Hizbullah have focused on the differences between 
Shia-Sunni religious doctrine and how it relates to the organization’s political goals, 
Hizbullah’s origins and development during the first decade of its existence, and its 
                                                 
1 A. Nizar Hamzeh, “Islamism in Lebanon: A Guide,” MERIA, Vol. 1, No. 3 (September 1997): 1-9. 
2 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 196. 
3 Febe Armanios, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites,” CRS Report for Congress (February 23, 2004): 
www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21745.pdf accessed January 22, 2007.  
4 Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System: Sources and Implications of Popular Support 
for Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” Journal Conflict of Resolution Vol. 40, No. 1 (March 1996): 41-67. 
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terrorist activities.5 According to Judith Palmer Harik, Hizbullah owes its success to a 
combination of “dynamic social, charitable, and educational activities (in contrast to its 
archaic religious discourse) and tactics that include the audacious harassment of Israeli 
forces, which has made the Islamic Resistance the principal anti-Israeli military force.”6 
 The relation between Islam and the state of Lebanon has been going through 
significant changes. There is a common misperception that the constituency of Hizbullah 
is Shia. Although it is a core section of the constituency, there are also Palestinians and 
Christians.7 Another misperception is promotion of Islam. In the early stages of 
Hizbullah’s emergence Hizbullah leaders agreed upon on their goal of establishing an 
Islamic regime in Lebanon, modeled after Iran, as one united Islamic state to encompass 
the entire Muslim world. However, since its election to parliament the party has opted to 
work within the political system, until the 2006 war. 
 Islamist violence and government repression steadily increased in the 1980s. As 
repression increased in the 1990s, Islamist movements were able to sustain themselves 
and grow, especially in heavily populated areas, provincial cities, the countryside, and 
transnational communities.8 Islamist movements contain elements common to social 
movements however, the specific context in which they operate such as political 
exclusion and repression to maintain rule, is what makes them unique.9 “Citizens, under  
                                                 
5 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 4, Hala 
Jaber, Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Magnus 
Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (London: Macmillan Press, 
1997), Nizar A. Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary 
Accomodation,” Third World Quarterly, 14, 2 (1993): 321-37, Judith Harik, The Public and Social Services 
of the Lebanese Militias (Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1994), “Between Islam and the System: 
Sources and Implications of Popular Support for Lebanon’s Hizbullah,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 
1 (March 1996): 41-67, Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizbullah” In Walter Reich (ed.), Modern 
Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 131-57, Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads.” MERIA, Volume 
1, No. 3 (September 1997): 1-15, Richard Augustus Norton, Hizbullah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. 
Mundane Politics (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). 
6 Judith Palmer Harik, “Between Islam and the System,” Journal Conflict of Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1 
(March 1996): 67. 
7 Ibid., 67. 
8 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Indiana University 
Press, 2004), 1-316. 
9 Ibid., 143-144. 
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such conditions, are forced to organize through informal networks and build collective 
identities through these networks; and it is this character of the Islamist movement which 
makes it distinct from other social movements.”10  
 Islamists have been more successful at directing their message and organizational 
strategies toward changing practices. By forming a collective identity, the people become 
mobilized supporters and build movements. From the collective action we can examine 
the four areas of social networks-  
• Opportunity structures that create incentives for movements to form; 
• The repertoire of collective action they use; 
• The social networks on which they are based; 
• The cultural frames around which their supporters are mobilized.11 
C. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPLIED TO HIZBULLAH 
1. Political Opportunity Structures 
The first notable change in the political opportunity structure for Hizbullah came 
with the parliamentary elections in 1992. This was the first public election in which the 
party was to participate in. The political space provided to Hizbullah allowed it to be 
recognized as a legitimate organization and was critical to the development of the 
Islamist movement. In addition to the Shia Muslims, support for Hizbullah came from 
different groups-Maronites and Palestinians.12 
A second change in the political opportunity structure was the Israeli withdrawal 
from Lebanon in 2000. It demonstrated that an armed Islamist group was able to inflict  
                                                 
10 Wiktorowicz, 144. 
11 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway, “Islamist Movements and the Democratic 
Process in the Arab World: Exploring the Gray Zones,” The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Number 67 (March 2006): 154.  
12 Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: SAQI, 2005), 105. 
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serious damage to Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon. This greatly enhanced the status of 
Hizbullah because it could claim to be the only group that had ever defeated Israel by 
compelling it to surrender territory it militarily controlled.13 
Finally, the third change in the political opportunity structure was the July 2006 
war. Though Hizbullah kidnapped Israeli soldiers, it was not their intent for a full out war 
with Israel. Israel and Hizbullah has had a history of prisoner exchanges that did not 
escalate to war. Israel’s disproportionate use of force by bombing infrastructure, 
buildings and the Beirut airport within the first few days of the war set off a reaction that 
even they were not prepared for. 
2. Mobilizing Structures 
Like Hamas, Hizbullah is a social movement with an institutional base more 
important to its success than any individual leader.14 While Hizbullah is regarded as a 
terrorist organization in the West, its ability to mobilize support from non-Shia groups is 
tied to its institutional network, which supplies many social services. A common rise of 
Islamist movements in the Arab world is because all Arab states are authoritarian to one 
degree or another and therefore dominate the public sphere.15 
Social service institutions such as schools and hospitals built by Hizbullah 
provide invaluable support to the general Lebanese population. If these institutions were 
to be removed, thousands would suffer. In many ways these institutions are important in 
mobilizing support and framing issues for Hizbullah. 
3. Cultural Framing 
To effectively popularize it ideology, a social movement must be able to provide a 
clear understanding of its ideology that resonates with its target audience.16 While it is  
                                                 
13 Wiktorowicz, 126. 
14 Ibid., 126. 
15 Ibid., 126. 
16 Ibid., 129. 
 5
unreasonable to expect the majority of its supporters to have detailed knowledge of its 
ideology, Hizbullah focuses on key issues facing Lebanese as a whole so that it can shape 
the public debate and imagination its own way.17 
Major frames employed by Hizbullah depicting its ideology are defensive. 
a. Resistance 
Hizbullah is seeking greater political power in cabinet, one third plus one, 
to further the cause of Resistance. The loss of Syrian control over decisions made by the 
Lebanese government has been a major factor in Hizbullah’s change of focus.18 When 
Syria was in control, it shielded the resistance from external and internal pressures to 
disarm. However, when Syria withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, Hizbullah was faced with 
international pressure to implement provisions of UN Resolution 1559 that stated the 
disarmament of all Lebanese militias. As a result, Hizbullah decided to integrate into the 
state by joining the government. Political participation was a means to a military end, 
resistance.19 
Defending Lebanon from Israeli aggression remains the same but the 
tactics have changed. Hizbullah’s aim is to have the capability to defend in the event of 
aggression.20 Hizbullah claims it has the right to self defense and only when the state is 
willing to carry out its responsibility will Hizbullah relinquish its defensive role.21 
b. Maintaining Arabism 
Hizbullah has made great strides in liberating the larger part of occupied 
Lebanon. It enjoys public support from political authorities, religious figures and 
factional powers.22 One of Hizbullah’s goals is achieving Islamic unity between the 
                                                 
17 Wiktorowicz, 129. 
18 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “In Their Own Words: Hizbollah’s Strategy in the Current Confrontation,” 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (January 2007): 1-14. 
19 Ibid., 6. 
20 Ibid., 12. 
21 Ibid., 13. 
22 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: SAQI, 2005), 105. 
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Sunnis and Shiites in different countries. What is meant by unity is for a common ground 
that will lead to cooperation, coordination and unification of efforts within the public 
sphere of common issues.23 The Palestinian issue involves all Muslims and deserves 
support. 
c. U.S. and Israel Against Hizbullah 
The U.S.-French brokered UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling 
for Hizbullah’s disarmament appeared to be the United States using Israel for a military 
assault against Hizbullah. During the war when the Bush administration consistently 
rejected an immediate cease fire, Hizbullah viewed this as the United States orchestrating 
the war and that war would have been inevitable regardless of the soldier kidnappings.24 
U.S. officials spoke of turning the Lebanon crisis into an opportunity for a New Middle 
East only legitimized Israel’s actions.25 Therefore, Hizbullah’s war with Israel was to 
block U.S. objectives and resist occupation. 
D. HIZBULLAH’S MEDIA FRAMING 
Throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah outperformed all 
conventional armies by using its ability to deflect the Israeli incursion, inflict losses on 
the Israeli army, and take the conflict to Israel itself through rocket attacks.26 Hizbullah 
perceived the United States as instigating as well as legitimizing Israel’s actions in 
prolonging the July 2006 conflict in order to create a new Middle East. In response, 
Hizbullah framed the conflict as a combined effort between the United States and Israel 
against Hizbullah. 
 Hizbullah’s television station Al-Manar played a pivotal role during the 
summertime war. In the first couple of weeks of the war the station was ranked number 
                                                 
23 Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: SAQI, 2005), 226. 
24 Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, “Hizbollah’s Outlook in the Current Conflict, Part One,” The Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace (August 2006): 1-4. 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Marwan Kraidy, “Hizbollywood. Hizbullah’s Information War Viewed from Lebanon,” The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy (October 17, 2006), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1426&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=201
758, accessed April 28, 2007. 
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83 of all the satellite television stations in the Middle East.27 By the middle of July the 
station had jumped to number 8. What can explain this jump in ratings? As part of an 
organizational structure, Hizbullah’s media and communications are not separate entities 
but are central aspects of the party. There is a structural organization with different 
departments. Hizbullah was able to frame the war to show that their reporters were 
resilient. After the bombings Al-Manar would send correspondents in convoys to cover 
the story. When the reporters were on location the station then aired the story as the 
physical survival of the reporters, being targeted by Israeli troops.28 
 Furthermore, Al-Manar broadcasted footage of the Israeli public expressing doubt 
about the military action and whether the IDF would succeed.29 Visual propaganda such 
as a map of Israel being burned and rapid response clips were also shown. This only 
aided in Hizbullah’s campaign as well as Hizbullah’s humanitarian propaganda. Al-
Manar would broadcast hourly news bulletins and show Hizbullah giving money to the 
people who suffered losses. The people shown on television would wave Hizbullah flags, 
flags from Amal, Lebanese flags and even a woman wearing a cross.30 These visual clips 
show that Hizbullah is not discriminate; it does not fight just for Hizbullah but for 
Lebanon as a whole.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Islamism can be understood through application of general concepts. Hizbullah is 
a social movement with thousands of supporters and activists. By applying social 
movement theory we recognize that Hizbullah shares many features of social movements 
around the world. These “terrorist groups” are more complex and need further study to 
understand what makes them unique. The following chapter will analyze Hizbullah as an 
organization and how its television station plays an important role in promoting its 
agenda. 
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II. HIZBULLAH AND AL-MANAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Hizbullah, the Party of God, is regularly listed on the U.S. State Department’s 
annual report on terrorist groups despite participation in domestic electoral politics and 
Lebanese protests that it is a legitimate movement of resistance towards Israel. The 
justification for including Hizbullah on the terrorist list focuses on its acts of terrorism 
towards the United States in the 1980s and its anti-Israel stance. Additionally, Hizbullah 
has been held responsible for numerous suicide bombings including the U.S. Embassy 
and Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, hijacking of TWA Flight 847 in 1985 and 
kidnappings. However, Hizbullah is also a social movement with thousands of 
sympathizers across confessional lines, engaging in political and social activities, 
adapting to changes in its environment internally and externally.  
One of the ways with which Hizbullah has managed to sustain its mobilization 
and further its political agenda is through its own television station Al-Manar. Research 
has shown that media coverage has had an influence on the outcome of conflicts.31 This 
chapter will be divided into two parts. The first section will examine the origin and 
organizational structure of Hizbullah through a brief history of Lebanon. The second 
section will focus on the creation of Al-Manar, its audience, and support. This chapter 
will also examine the relationship between the media and the organization, and show that 
they are related in processes of political and technological change. 
B. BRIEF HISTORY OF LEBANON 
From a historical perspective, Lebanon has been in a state of war. Differences 
among the people are reflected geographically by massive population movements 
between Christian and Muslim areas. Between 1516 and 1918 Lebanon and Syria were 
under Ottoman sovereignty and consisted of a northern and southern region. The earliest 
                                                 
31 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). 
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evidence of Lebanese identity can be traced back to the first half of the nineteenth 
century. During this time the Shihabs, a Sunnite Muslim family, had inherited the emirate 
over the Druzes and Christians and then converted to Christianity according to the 
Maronite rite, then extended their rule to all of Mount Lebanon.32 The Lebanese entity 
emerged; separate from Syria, bringing Maronite, Druze, Christian and Muslim sects 
under the rule of one government. 
With diverse origins and establishments under different circumstances, various 
religious communities in Lebanon grew as distinct groups with special social character. 
The Shi’ites, Druzes, and Maronites developed as rebel mountaineers, which a strong 
spirit of independence.33 The Shi’ites prolonged history of persecution and repression has 
reflected itself as politically timid. The Maronites and Druzes, politically more 
successful, show tighter social organization and are accustomed to self rule. The Druzes 
have traditionally excelled the Maronites in their sense of solidarity, their social 
discipline, and strict obedience to their leaders, general resilience and adaptability.34 
The Sunnites enjoyed the special security of privileged membership in a universal 
Muslim state. They had no interest in internal Lebanese politics and were mostly content 
to enjoy the advantages of being Muslim. Because of their customary dependence on 
government favor, they never developed the self-reliance of other Lebanese sects, like the 
Maronites or Druzes.35 As a result, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed and Lebanon 
was organized as a completely separate political entity under French mandate, the 
Sunnites were at a loss and knew no way of adapting themselves to their changed 
situation.36 They became an element of instability in Lebanon. 
The religious identity of Ottoman Lebanese people were singled out for modern 
reform and an open-ended struggle between European, Ottoman, and local elites ensued 
over the relationship between religion and politics. European and Ottoman officials tried 
                                                 
32 Kamal S. Salibi, “The Lebanese Identity,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1971): 
76-81+83-86. 
33 Ibid., 77. 
34 Ibid., 77. 
35 Ibid., 80. 
36 Ibid., 80. 
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to win the loyalty of the locals, the French, by claiming to protect the Maronites, the 
British the Druzes, and the Ottomans using the sultan’s name. As a result, the Maronite 
Church assumed a prominent role in local politics. It alleged that only under a Maronite 
emirate led by a Shihab emir could the Christian subjects of Ottoman Lebanon enjoy the 
tranquility, security, and prosperity of the Tanzimat.37 Although a new era defined 
communal rather than secular terms, sectarian politics reflected a tension between 
inclusion and exclusion with regard to political participation. 
C. ORIGIN OF HIZBULLAH 
A review of the literature demonstrates that Hizbullah’s formation can be 
attributed to several factors, namely the under-representation of Shiites, the Iranian 
Revolution and the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The first factor was the lack of Shia 
Muslim representation in the political structure of the government. Based on a census 
taken in 1932, the three largest groups were the Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and 
Shia Muslims. The lack of power experienced by the Shiites can be attributed to the 
political domination of Maronites and Sunnis.38 As birthrates increased for the Sunnis, 
they called for greater representation in government. The country was divided along 
religious lines and as a result, government offices were distributed according to 
confessional lines such that the Maronites were given the office of the President, Sunni-
the Prime Minister and Shia-the Parliament Speaker; which was more of a title holder 
than actual political power.  
Throughout the 1970s, Yasir Arafat and thousands of his fellow Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) militants used Lebanon as a base to attack Israel and 
exacerbate Christian-Muslim strains.39 When the civil war broke out in April 1975 
                                                 
37 Ussama Makdisi, “Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth –
Century Ottoman Lebanon,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 42, No. 1 (January 
2000):195. 
38 Augustus Richard Norton, “Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon,” 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 482, Changing Patterns of Power in 
the Middle East, (November 1985):109-121. 




between Maronite Christians of the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese National 
Movement, the Maronite dominated government asked for support from Syria. 
The Shiites were at the bottom end of the socioeconomic status. The lack of social 
and economic development was another factor in their status as second class citizens. 
Most of the Shiites were farmers living in villages in southern Lebanon or in the 
undeveloped Bekaa Valley. They lacked education and as the most deprived community 
in Lebanon, they did not receive any services that were provided by the government. 
 The second factor in Hizbullah’s establishment was the Iranian Revolution, a 
source of inspiration for Shia religious leaders in Lebanon. The Iranian Revolution 
demonstrated that a well-organized Shiite community could push for a political action 
against repression and dependence on America’s secular culture.40 Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini played an important role in mobilizing resistance to developments in Iran. 
 The third factor of Hizbullah’s development was the 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon. Shia groups rushed to fill the gap left open after the expulsion of the PLO from 
Lebanon.41 There was a growing Islamic awareness among the Lebanese Shia in 
movements such as the Movement of the Disinherited and Amal, founded by Iranian born 
Sayyid Musa Sadr in 1975. Sadr wanted to cooperate with the Lebanese Maronites in 
return for leadership of the Shia community. Amal was a military force to ensure the 
community’s position. Sadr disappeared in 1978 while on a trip to Libya and the event 
has been a source of contention between the Islamic Republic and Libya.42 Many of 
Hizbullah’s recruits came from Amal, including followers of radical non-clerics Hussein 
Musawi and Mustafa Dirani.43 Israel had contacted Shia leaders prior to the 1982 
invasion to create an anti-Palestinian ally in Lebanon. The Shiites welcomed the invasion 
                                                 
40 Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah-The Changing Face of Terrorism (I.B. Tauris & Co., 2004), 1-241. 
41 Eyal Zisser, “Hizballah in Lebanon: At the Crossroads,” MERIA, Volume 1, No. 3, (September 
1997): 1-15. 
42 Kenneth Katzman, “Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon,” in Terrorism: National Security 
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thinking it would remove the Palestinian forces from the south, but then turned against 
Israel after the invasion and occupation.44  
 As fighting continued in eastern Lebanon, Iran sent Revolutionary Guards to help 
combat the Israelis. The Guards began to propagate Iran’s Islamic Revolution to the Shia 
as well as offering social welfare programs, schools and hospitals.45 By late 1982 Iraqi 
educated Lebanese clerics and non-clerical militants began calling themselves Hizbullah, 
the Party of God, which comes from a verse in the Quran that states, “The party of Allah, 
they are victorious.”46 With aid from Iran, Hizbullah was given arms, Islamic teachers, 
military equipment and millions of dollars.47 
D. ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS 
Politically and militarily Hizbullah’s organizational structure has remained 
flexible, which has allowed it to survive longer than other militias. Traditionally, the 
organization has been based on the personal authority and of its clerical leaders and its 
militia commanders, along with clans and families. Hizbullah has tried to be more 
centralized and structured by forming a consultative council-subordinate to the Secretary 
General and deputy Secretary General. There are three regional councils corresponding to 
its areas of greatest influence in Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley (the base of most of 
Hezbollah’s senior clerics), the southern suburbs of Beirut (where many Shia migrated 
during 1975-90 civil war), and the traditional Shia villages in southern Lebanon.48 
 The Supreme Shura Council, the highest authority in the party is composed of 17 
members including the Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, his deputy, clergy and para-
military leaders.49 Next are the Executive Shura which oversees district actions and the 
Politburo which coordinates work for the various committees below it.50 Decisions of the 
                                                 
44 Katzman, 3. 
45 Katzman, 7. 
46 Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballah’s Al-Manar Television (Washington, DC: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004), 8. 
47 Ibid., 8. 
48 Katzman, 7. 
49 Hamzeh, 7. 
50 Hamzeh.,7. 
 14
consultative council are implemented by a political Bureau chosen by an electoral body 
of delegates that meet in Congress every four years. A separate executive committee 
oversees the regional commands and several administrative departments such as social 
affairs, finance, trade union affairs, education, health, and information.51 Al-Manar, the 
party’s television station, is available by satellite and is under the Enforcement, 
Recruitment and Propaganda Organ. It is the main outlet for information and propaganda 
regarding the organization’s agenda and will be studied later in the thesis. 
 An important strength of Hizbullah is its ability to deliver social services when 
and where the Lebanese government could not. This has made the party popular among 
the Lebanese Shias, attracting recruits and taking away support from rival party Amal. 
Hizbullah has provided clean water, hospitals, and subsidized medical clinics; runs 
schools staffed by well-qualified teachers, provided public assistance facilities, and 
rebuilds damaged homes for poor Lebanese.52 During a winter storm in 1991-1992, 
Hizbullah organized teams of relief workers to open roads and distribute food and other 
provisions to villages cut off in the storm.53 Additionally, the Holy Struggle for 
Reconstruction, an arm of Hizbullah, financed repairs of over 1,000 homes in south 
Lebanon following an Israeli offensive into two Shia areas north of the security zone 
villages.54 
 The main military bases are in the Bekaa Valley. Fighters tend to operate in 
dispersed, small units to avoid being a concentrated target with information and support 
coming from the local Shia population.55 Recently, Hizbullah fighters in south Lebanon 
have pioneered new tactics, infiltrating into Israel’s security zone and waiting in ambush 
for days to hit Israeli patrols from long range. Support units nearby then hit Israeli strong 
points with mortars as its infiltration units escape the zone.56  
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 During the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon (1982-1985), Hizbullah conducted 
car, truck, and remote detonation bombings against Israeli forces. The militia, a light 
force, was equipped with small arms (automatic rifles), mortars, rocket propelled 
grenades, and Katyusha rockets.57 They have also been seen with tanks and armored 
personnel carriers captured from the Lebanese army or purchased from Palestinian 
guerrillas. In the past two decades the fighting between Israeli forces and Hizbullah has 
taken a heavy toll on both sides. Although Israel claims it has fully withdrawn from 
Lebanon, Hizbullah justifies continued attacks as resistance of Israeli occupation of the 
disputed Shebaa Farms in the Golan Heights, captured by Israel during the 1967 war.58 
E. AL-MANAR 
1. Creation 
Throughout its history Hizbullah’s ideology has been of resistance. In addition to 
its fighting force, the party has been able to disseminate this ideology not only in 
Lebanon but throughout the Arab world through its own television station. Programming 
emphasizes concepts such as “oppression” and “occupation” as well as Israel’s existence 
as terrorism.59 Although Al-Manar itself does not carry out acts of terrorism, it does 
promote acts of resistance and considers violent actions towards Israel as legitimate.60 
Furthermore, U.S. support for Israel is viewed by Hizbullah as condoning their 
oppressive behavior. 
 The first television station to be broadcast in Lebanon was La Compagnie Libanaise 
(CLT) on May 28, 1959.61 As time passed additional stations began broadcasting and in 
the mid-1980s a small group of men who studied media in London launched Al-Manar.62 
In 1989 the Taif Accord brought an end to the civil war. It transferred power away from 
the Lebanese presidency and invested it in a cabinet divided equally between Muslims 
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and Christians. It also called for a reorganization of Lebanese media, including television.  
After  the  war  Hizbullah  began  to  play  a  role  in  politics  and decided  to establish  a  
television station to reach out to the Lebanese public. Al-Manar began broadcasting on 
June 3, 1991. In 1994 all stations were subjected to government licensing.63  
 
          In 1996 government licenses were given to only five television stations: 
 
• Tele-Liban, the government’s official station; 
• Lebanese Broadcasting Company International (LBCI) representing Maronite 
Christians, 
• Future Television (al-Mustaqbal) representing Sunnis, 
• Murr Television representing Greek Orthodox Christians and 
• The National Broadcasting Network representing Lebanese Shiites.64 
 
Approximately fifty stations were closed and criticisms arose that licensing choices were 
based on political and sectarian considerations and not on professional standards.65 
During this time Al-Manar continued to broadcast. As the only militia remaining under 
the Taif Accord, Hizbullah was seen as a force capable of removing Israel from southern 
Lebanon. So, with influence from the Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad, the Lebanese 
cabinet granted Al-Manar an operating license.66 
 In 2000 Al-Manar launched a satellite channel and is the only 24 hour station. 
Located in the poor Harat Hurayk neighborhood of southern Beirut, Al-Manar is in a six 
story building with newsrooms, studios, television screens and other equipment that can 
be found in other television stations. There are several things that make Al-Manar 
different from other stations. First, there are security guards posted outside the building 
checking identification of visitors. Second, employees are in their twenties and thirties 
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with on the job training.67 Male employees wear suits and female employees wear the 
traditional Islamic veil. It is not required that the employees are Hizbullah members, 
however, most of the reporters served as guerilla fighters prior to working at Al-Manar.68 
Additionally, there are special correspondents in the Palestinian territories and Iraq and 
Palestinians who speak Hebrew.69 Special training courses are provided to the employees 
to “enhance their political, social, educational, and technical backgrounds.”70 
2. Audience 
Unlike other news stations Al-Manar is not interested in being objective or 
balanced. Its purpose is to spread propaganda to “wage effective psychological warfare 
against the Zionist enemy.”71 The traditional target audience was the Lebanese public. In 
the last few years with its satellite reach it now encompasses the Arab world as well as 
the Israelis. Al-Manar has steadily increased its viewership especially in times of conflict 
in southern Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories. 
3. Funding 
The station reportedly receives money from Iran, however, station officials 
maintain that the station obeys Lebanese laws and does not receive money from foreign 
governments.72 Other monetary support comes from donations from Shiite supporters 
around the world.73 There are also corporate sponsors for commercial advertising and  
funding from businesses such as construction companies, heavy machinery 
manufacturers, and drug trafficking operations located in Beirut, southern Lebanon, and 
the Bekaa Valley.74 
                                                 
67 Jorisch, 22. 
68 Ibid., 22. 
69 Ibid., 22. 
70 Ibid., 22. 
71 Ibid., 26.  
72 Ibid., 32. 
73 Ibid., 32. 
74 Ibid., 33.  
 18
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the history of Lebanon, Hizbullah and Al-Manar. 
Hizbullah has demonstrated that it is a social movement driven politically and 
ideologically with clear strategic goals and extensive experience in guerrilla warfare. The 
Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 and the latest July 2006 war has greatly 
enhanced the organization’s status in the Middle East and given the impression that there 
will be victory in future conflicts with Israel. The propaganda is further disseminated 
through their television station. While in the organization’s early years they were 
emphasizing establishing an Islamic state modeled after Iran, it appears it is no longer the 
case. Hizbullah’s involvement in Lebanon’s government represents the culmination of 
years of Shiite effort to have a significant role in Lebanon’s political system. The 
following chapter will analyze the way with which Hizbullah uses the media to influence 
public opinion in relation to changes in its domestic environment. 
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III. POLITICAL STANCE 
A. KEY EVENTS FROM 1990 TO 2000 
This chapter of the thesis will analyze Hizbullah’s media techniques using three 
types of frames-governance, military and humanitarian. This section will be divided into 
two sections. The first section will cover the period from 1990 to 2000, with emphasis on 
the first parliamentary elections Hizbullah takes part in. The second section will cover 
from the period of 2000 (Israeli withdrawal) to 2006, prior to the July war. This chapter 
will show how Hizbullah was able to use the media to affect public opinion.  
1. Historical Background  
The period from 1990 to 2000 was important for Hizbullah in terms of 
establishing legitimacy. The Taif Accord of 1989 ended the civil war and equally divided 
the seats of Parliament between the Muslims and Christians, in contrast to the prior 
distribution of 6 to 5 favoring Christians.75 The 128 parliamentary seats are subdivided 
along confessional lines with 27 seats each to the largest sects- Shia, Sunni, and 
Maronites.76 The Taif Accord reflected communal groups as part of the Lebanese social 
structure and had three distinguishing features. First, power is shared by the President, a 
Maronite; the Prime Minister, a Sunni; and the president of parliament, a Shia, each of 
whom has veto power over the other two.77 The president had increased power to draft 
and administer laws. However, decisions affecting national security must be approved by 
a two-thirds majority. Second, Syria had taken the opportunity to exert external pressure 
on Lebanon, promoting secularism and maintaining a presence through its forces. And 
third, it contemplated “the creation of new institutions in the areas of constitutional  
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oversight, judicial independence, economic regulation, social protection, and 
administrative decentralization, in order to strengthen the state and encourage power 
sharing.”78 
In 1991 the ministerial declaration stated both the Lebanese and non-Lebanese 
militias would be disbanded, disarmed, and rehabilitated as a communal reconciliation 
and a way to reestablish state authority.79 The declaration applied to the following major 
militias-the Jaysh al-Sha’bi of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Amal 
Movement, and the Lebanese Forces (LF) and various smaller local militias.80 However, 
Hizbullah and the South Lebanon Army (SLA) did not turn in their weapons; close their 
headquarters, or training camps. Since Hizbullah did not enter the civil war and refrained 
from using weapons to solve any political differences,81 it viewed itself as a resistance 
force was therefore excluded from the militia label.  
Dissatisfied with the Taif Accord and the confessional electoral system Hizbullah 
decided to participate in the first postwar parliamentary elections in 1992. Sheikh Naim 
Qassem, Hizbullah’s Deputy Secretary General, gave several advantages for 
participation. First, representation in parliament could draw attention and support for 
resistance. Second, issues concerning the living standards of the deprived regions could 
be heard. Third, participation allowed knowledge of legislation and a network of political 
relations. And finally, there was a presentation of an Islamic point of view. However, 
drawbacks included the limited number of representatives allowed in Parliament and the 
passage of legislation that may not conform to Shari’a principles.82 These did not 
interfere with the priority of resisting Israeli occupation so the organization decided to 
take part in the elections. Hizbullah and its non-Shia electoral allies won twelve seats, 
including eight Shia seats. 
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2. Media Framing in the 1990s 
To understand the coverage of events in Lebanon it is necessary to consider the 
content within which it takes place. Al-Manar was created in the early 1990s according to 
the first general manager Ali Dahir, “to express the views of the oppressed…and 
advocate a mass media that respects Islamic morals and Muslim tradition. The goal of the 
station is to show the facts, focus on our hostility and hate towards Israel and its racist 
government system, whose downfall we see as a fundamental principle of ours.”83 Since 
the station’s signal could only reach within the country, Al-Manar programming focused 
primarily on domestic issues, emphasizing religion and prayer. Programs were divided 
into music videos, talk shows, series and dramas, news, children and family shows.84 
Docudramas are dedicated to guerrillas who died fighting against Israel. Music videos 
last approximately three minutes and generally express seven themes:  
• Self-promotion, which usually involves depicting Hizbullah as the liberator of 
southern Lebanon 
• The importance of resistance and guerrilla operations, and the prominent role of 
Hizbullah’s leaders (especially Nasrallah and the late Sheikh Abbas Musawi, 
Hizbullah’s second secretary-general) 
• The glory of martyrdom 
• Anti-American fervor 
• Israel and Zionism as the embodiments of terrorism 
• The future of Arab youths (in particular, the notion that Israel is killing the Arab 
world’s future by killing its children) 
• The destruction of Israel (this theme is often punctuated by references to the 
occupation of Jerusalem).85 
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a. Governance Frames 
Though Al-Manar was not granted an operating license until July 1997, 
the station did not stop broadcasting up to this time. The intent was to influence Lebanese 
perception and support for domestic affairs. During the first post-war parliamentary 
elections Hizbullah was not accustomed to the work and mobilization efforts required for 
an election. However, Hizbullah was able to create an organized campaign operation, 
drawing in not only the religiously devout, but those that believed in the viewpoints and 
actions of Hizbullah. Regular coverage was increased from five hours a day to seven with 
news bulletins disseminating Hizbullah’s message to people. At the political level, 
Hizbullah had six objectives that it wanted to achieve. First, was protection of Lebanon 
from Israel. This meant instituting a program for guiding recruits in the defense of south 
Lebanon and Western Bekaa. Second, was to collaborate with loyalists to abolish 
political sectarianism. Third, allowing the Lebanese people to select their representatives 
by considering Lebanon as a whole. Fourth, allow the freedom of religious expression 
and political work. The media would have its own set of rights but must also respect 
public morals and general civility.86 Fifth, award Lebanese nationality, and finally, 
allowing those displaced to return. 
Hizbullah’s success during the election was to due to the presence of party 
supporters at every ballot in distinct dress code and constant communications with 
supervisors.87 By the 1996 elections additional antennas were erected in northern 
Lebanon and throughout Mount Lebanon to expand its audience.88 Additionally, 
Hizbullah was able to represent various sects on a regional level by establishing a 
coalition of parliamentarians- eight of the Shi’ite sect, two Sunnis, one Roman Catholic 
and one Maronite Christian. Participation in the elections of 1996 and 2000 demonstrates 
that Hizbullah has been able to reach out to the various groups. They have actively 
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participated in discussions regarding legislation and budgetary measures for the deprived 
areas of Lebanon. The media coverage was able to rally the Lebanese public on issues 
that mattered to them. 
b. Military Frames 
Al-Manar’s coverage during military conflicts such as Operation 
Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 did not concentrate much 
attention on military and strategic issues. Instead the military frames were more graphic 
and emphasized damage on buildings and infrastructure caused by Israel. In Operation 
Accountability Israel used its air force, navy and land artillery targeting the South, Bekaa 
area and the Palestinian camps in the north near Beirut. The aggression resulted in the 
deaths of 140 civilians including 13 members of the resistance, 500 wounded civilians 
and approximately 200,000 inhabitants of South Lebanon were displaced.89 Operation 
Grapes of Wrath began with an Israeli air raid in April 1996. It continued to a Lebanese 
army base in Tyre followed by shelling of a building in Beirut’s southern suburb of Haret 
Hreik.90 The operation was more aggressive than the one in 1993 since it was 
geographically larger and lasted longer. In all, 250 civilians died including four members 
of the resistance, and thousands were displaced.91  
Al-Manar’s coverage of both conflicts dealt with the issue of resilience. By being 
present at the scene, Hizbullah was able to use Al-Manar to air footage of destroyed 
homes as well as dead and wounded civilians. The pictures of the massacre at Qana 
proved to be especially damaging towards Israel. Hizbullah also conveyed developments 
on discussions with various Lebanese political parties to come together and unite against 
Israeli aggression.92 As a result, Al-Manar effectively portrayed Israel in a negative tone. 
The primary framing of the military efforts focused on civilian deaths while examining 
the destruction of infrastructure and homes. 
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c. Humanitarian Frames 
Most of Al-Manar’s coverage frames conflicts in terms of the human toll 
and personal suffering of Lebanese. Footage is not sanitized so there are graphic images 
of death and destruction that are sure to have a profound affect on the audience. Reporters 
conduct interviews with surviving wounded children who have lost all family members, 
or with individuals searching rubble for relatives. These images alone need no words to 
make viewers empathize with the individual. In addition to reporting on the two major 
conflicts during 1990 to 2000, Hizbullah used the media to portray itself as a contributor 
of social services.  
Hizbullah founded the Jihad al-Binaa Association for construction and 
development and restores homes damaged by Israeli aggression since 1991.93 Drinking 
water is made available to areas that are not able to receive the public service such as 
Beirut’s southern suburbs, and is free of charge.94 Hizbullah also monitors agricultural 
activities and provides vocational training for villagers. The party founded the Islamic 
Health Organization and manages nine health centers, providing free medication and 
health services.95 There are various other organizations that Hizbullah has founded. 
These range from providing educational support to the needy, care for the wounded 
(civilians and resistance fighters), to philanthropic institutions that provide financial 
support for the families of martyrs who had given their lives in the resistance.96 Although 
the social work is alongside the resistance, it is often viewed by the West as a mode of 
recruitment. According to Hizbullah, the services they provide are to relieve the burden 
of those who have suffered as a result of Israeli aggression.97 It also helps Hizbullah 
maintain support for its cause. 
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B. KEY EVENTS FROM 2000 TO 2006 
1. Historical Background 
 Despite UN Security Resolution 425 passed in 1978 calling for Israel to respect 
Lebanon’s internationally recognized boundaries and withdrawing its forces from 
Lebanese territory,98 Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon spanned more than two 
decades. General Ehud Barak was elected prime minister of Israel in 1999 and promised 
to withdraw from Lebanon within one year of assuming office, either in bilateral 
negotiations with Syria or unilaterally.99 Preparatory discussion between Israel and Syria 
failed in March 2000. Barak refused to release Syrian land by Lake Tiberius which the 
Syrians found unacceptable. As a result Israel focused on unilateral withdrawal. During 
this time Hizbullah maintained a position of ambiguity. They did not directly announce 
that the violence would stop after the Israeli withdrawal. Hizbullah propagandists learned 
Hebrew and began using the television station to broadcast the results of Israeli 
aggression in Hebrew. By 2000 Israeli public opinion had shifted in favor of a pullout 
from Lebanon. Israel withdrew in May and many displaced residents immediately 
flooded into the south to reclaim their homes and villages. 
The following summer a debate arose within Hizbullah about whether to focus on 
Lebanese political issues or maintain the resistance posture.100 After internal party 
discussions Hizbullah continued the resistance using paramilitary operations by attacking 
Israeli patrols on farmland by the village of Shebaa.101 Lebanon claims the land so Israeli 
military presence allows Hizbullah to maintain a military stance claiming that Israel has 
not fully withdrawn from the country.  
From 2000 to 2006 one Israeli civilian was killed by Hizbullah weapons, five 
were killed in a Palestinian operation, nine Israeli soldiers died in attacks in the farm area 
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and eight others were killed along the “Blue Line.”102 At least 21 Israeli soldiers were 
wounded and a total of 17 Israeli soldiers were killed in contrast to an average of 25 
Israeli soldiers who died annually during Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon.103 The 
six year period was a relatively quiet time in comparison to past standards. 
In October 2000 Hizbullah captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms and 
later released the bodies in 2004.104 As a result of that operation, Israel continued its 
routine of violations of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters.105 Israeli war planes 
would fly over Beirut with sonic booms. Soon after, Hizbullah began firing anti-aircraft 
weapons at the planes, with ammunition rounds landing in Israel. They also fired 
katyusha rockets into Golan Heights. The episodes of violence in the Shebaa Farms 
became routine between Israel and Hizbullah. 
The Second Intifada or Palestinian uprising was partially inspired by Hizbullah’s 
success in forcing the Israeli withdrawal. Hizbullah flags flew in many Palestinian camps 
in the West Bank and Gaza, and Hizbullah played an important role in training anti-
Israeli Palestinians.106 However, Nasrallah stressed that the Palestinians were to be 
responsible for liberating Palestine and the liberation of the Golan Heights belonged to 
Syria. It was also during this time that Al-Manar began satellite propaganda broadcasting 
to many Palestinians. Viewership had peaked in 2001, dropped in 2003 and then risen to 
number six by 2006.107 
2. Media Framing in 2000 to 2006 
 The launching of Al-Manar’s satellite channel signified freedom from Israeli 
occupation. At first the station had three hours of programming. Then it began 24 hour 
broadcasting to target the pan-Arab and Islamic world, to give viewers a feeling that they 
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were a part of something more. Al-Manar also began to project itself as a guardian of 
Islamic values.108 The station’s emphasis switched from fighting Israel to supporting the 
Palestinians and protecting Lebanon.109 Station highlights include airing resistance 
activities such as Hizbullah soldiers keeping watch on the border or a woman being 
watched for safety as she sleeps.110  
a. Governance Frames 
In the period following Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Palestine and 
Lebanese domestic politics were still of primary concern for Hizbullah. However, there 
were two targets from 2000 to 2004-the United States and Israel. The tone of Al-Manar 
programming changed significantly with the airing of more propaganda videos 
highlighting the withdrawal, Hizbullah’s military campaign, the south’s liberation and 
Israel’s military weakness.111 There were several justifications for this change in focus: 
• Lebanon borders what Hizbullah refers to as “1948 Palestine.” 
• From Al-Manar’s perspective, Palestinians are oppressed. 
• Because Palestinians have helped Hizbullah in its battle against Israel, 
Hizbullah must offer its services in kind. 
• Palestinians and Lebanese share a mutual enemy: Israel.112 
In a clip, images of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were shown promoting “the station of 
resistance” and appealing to Arabs and Muslims, and to the weeping mothers of those 
who’ve died. Propaganda videos began to call for Arab unity, specifically targeting Arab  
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citizens of Israel to join in the Palestinian struggle. To provoke further anti-Israel 
sentiment, Al-Manar alleged that Israel was responsible for the September 11, 2001 
attack.  
  From 2000 to 2004 secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah was shown on Al-
Manar multiple times trying to rally Arabs who by numbers alone could liberate Palestine 
and Jerusalem. His efforts were aimed at the citizens and governments for failing to fully 
support the Palestinians.113 Al-Manar encouraged Arabs and Muslims to become more 
active in the struggle, calling for demonstrations. There were two videos-“Death to 
Israel” and “Rise up, Rise up, You Arab” that clearly expressed Hizbullah’s goal of 
destroying Israel.114 These videos show suicide bombers and the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks. Additionally, a talk show entitled The Spider’s House, focuses on weaknesses of 
Israel and strategies on how to defeat them. Al-Manar has also portrayed Zionism as 
terrorism, responsible for the deaths of doctors, nurses, the elderly and priests.115  
  The second part of Al-Manar programming was directed at the United 
States. Al-Manar focused on the United States as an oppressor, especially its treatment of 
Native Americans and expropriation of their land.116 Guests on the shows often warn 
viewers in Palestine and the Arab world that they too will suffer like the Native 
Americans if they do not rise up and resist the United States. In a video the Statue of 
Liberty is holding a knife; head has been transformed into a skull with hollow eyes, and 
gown dripping in blood.117 This is to show that the United States commits crimes against 
humanity. According to Hizbullah and Al-Manar resentment is directed towards U.S. 
foreign policy. The alliance between Israel and the United States is portrayed as a bond  
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between oppressors to do as they please regarding the Palestinian people, the Intifada, 
and the resistance.118 The United States is regarded as the primary sponsor of Israel, 
allowing it to cause terror and prevent the return of refugees. 
b. Military Frames 
With the outbreak of the intifada Al-Manar began to list program times 
according to “Occupied Jerusalem Time” and expanded its news bulletins to focus on the 
intifada. These included interviews with Palestinian rejectionists and leaders of terrorist 
organizations. As a result Lebanese coverage was pushed to the end of news bulletins. 
Al-Manar typically reported on Israeli military operations and Palestinian attacks in the 
form of special news flashes.119 Music videos began to combine footage of Hizbullah 
attacks on Israeli military installations and footage of Palestinian clashes with the IDF.120 
The message is that both struggles are the same and that Hizbullah’s success should be 
applied to the Palestinian uprising. Propaganda videos depict Israel as weak and afraid of 
suicide bombers and military defeat.121 Calling for Arab unity, the station showed 
Hizbullah guerrillas marching in the direction of Jerusalem as well as riots on the Temple 
Mount and of Hizbullah operations against the IDF in southern Lebanon.122 
During Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan Al-Manar showed 
extensive coverage of U.S. military operations.123 Correspondents were sent to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan to cover the story. Reporters were known for reporting news 
footage wearing flak jackets and running alongside Hizbullah guerrillas during attacks.124 
Live footage has greatly given Al-Manar the advantage of breaking stories. During 
Operation Iraqi Freedom programming was altered to appeal to the pan-Arab audience. It 
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covered the conflict and called for violent acts against Americans in the region.125 Talk 
shows included U.S. military operations (Hard on the Heels of the Event) and American 
Aggression.126  
With the U.S. led campaign against Iraq, Hizbullah openly called for acts 
of violence against Americans in the region.127 Al-Manar depicted the war and its 
aftermath as an indication that the United States is seeking to create a Zionist entity. The 
station broadcasted calls for acts of resistance against U.S. forces in Iraq. When U.S. 
military personnel are in danger Al-Manar propaganda incites violence and hatred toward 
Americans. 
c. Humanitarian Frames 
In terms of humanitarian frames the intifada shifted focus to the Israeli-
Palestinian arena for Al-Manar. The station began to publicly offer its services to the 
Palestinians, inciting them to violence, encouraging them to refuse negotiations with 
Israel and to work towards obliterating the Jewish state.128 Muhammad al-Dura, a 
Palestinian boy who was shot during an Israeli-Palestinian clash in 2000 became the face 
of the conflict. Footage of his death regarded as murder by Israel dominated the airwaves 
and caused outrage throughout the Arab world. His death symbolized the Palestinian 
struggle and Al-Manar used it in many of its programs and propaganda videos.129 
Terrorists, a half hour weekly series, dedicates itself to proving Zionism is 
terrorism by featuring gory footage of dead children, wounded Arabs covered in blood, 
children lying in hospital beds and adults lying in coffins.130 Additionally there are eye 
witness interviews with crying children, distraught senior citizens, and other wounded in 
Israeli operations.131 Every episode contains many of Israel’s leading figures and 
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references to the Jewish book, showing viewers that Jews are commanded to kill through 
their religion and their leaders follow it.132 Al-Manar has been able to incite Palestinian 
violence by casting the Palestinian people as heroic underdogs facing a powerful 
enemy.133 Featured images include Palestinian demonstrations with angry crowds 
shaking their fists to the sky and chanting slogans, burning Israeli flags; Molotov 
cocktails being thrown and Israeli military vehicles in flames.134 
C. CONCLUSION 
From the 1990s to 2000 Hizbullah mainly focused on establishing legitimacy 
through its participation in parliamentary elections and on its humanitarian efforts. 
Hizbullah’s fight with Israel dominated Al-Manar’s airwaves from 2000 to 2005. Al-
Manar’s support of the Palestinians and its association with the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict ensured Hizbullah’s status in the region and throughout the Arab world.135 The 
conflict increased Hizbullah’s stature and allowed the organization to maintain its 
legitimacy among its constituents. The next chapter will analyze what caused the July 
2006 war between Israel and Hizbullah, and its aftermath. 
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IV. LEBANON WAR 
A. POST-CIVIL WAR LEBANON 
Chapter four is divided into four sections. The first section examines how 
confessionalism played a role in Lebanese society after the fifteen year civil war, the 
assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri, and events prior to the Israeli-
Hizbullah war. The second section analyzes Hizbullah’s motives and strategy during the 
July war. The third section examines how Hizbullah used its media to shape public 
opinion of the war, and the last section discusses Hizbullah’s role in Lebanon after the 
war. 
1. Changing Face of Society 
The fifteen year civil war in Lebanon that ended in 1990 was not a conflict only 
between Christians and Muslims. It involved many different sectarian groups at odds 
over the Palestinian cause. Many Lebanese Christians (Greek Orthodox), about ten 
percent of the population during the civil war, tended to be much more sympathetic than 
the Maronites to the Palestinians.136 The increased confessionalism can be attributed to 
four factors. First, the outbreak of the civil war displaced a significant number of people 
into more segmented groups. Second, economic difficulties, income inequality and 
corruption exceeded $1.5 billion a year.137 This increased the national debt to $40 billion 
because spending on infrastructure damaged during conflicts and the Israeli invasion.138 
The huge debt had severely limited economic opportunities and resulted in the shrinking 
middle class, the increased number of Lebanese emigrating (mostly Christians who have 
easier access to visas), and a growing dependence on the patronage of new sectarian 
political bosses from the population.139  
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The war itself established a confessional system dividing the population along 
ethnic lines. A third factor was the revival of religious institutions and leaders. Clerics 
began to dominate within sectarian organizations and in Hizbullah, Muhammad Ra’ad 
and Muhammad Fneish, the only two non-clerical members of the seven-member al-
shura (consultation body), were replaced by clerics in 2001.140 Syrian pressure in 
Lebanon since 1976 prevented independent political personalities to develop as leaders. 
This allowed religious figures to step in and compromise the political system by 
advancing a model for a religious based society.141  
The last factor is the relationship between Sunni and Shia in respect to regional 
developments. According to Norton, Lebanese Shia banded together with the American 
occupation of Iraq because of a shared identity.142 Additionally, the rise of Sunni 
movements like Al-Qaeda who are very anti-Shia has encouraged Shia Muslims not only 
in Lebanon but across the Middle East to identify themselves in more sectarian terms.143 
2. Assassination of Rafiq Hariri 
Rafiq Hariri left office in 1998 and then returned as prime minister in 2000. In the 
run up towards the 2000 elections, according to Syria, nineteen seats in Beirut would be 
divided between three Sunni politicians.144 Ghazi Kanaan, the pro-Syrian consul in 
Lebanon had redrawn the electoral districts in Beirut to support Syria’s plan.145 However, 
Hariri won eighteen seats and Hizbullah was given one. Hariri had good ties with Syrian 
vice president Abdul Halim Khaddam and it was reported that $400 million in foreign 
investment for Syria was the reward.146 
The next four years for Hariri were marked by political deadlock and frustration, 
especially with Emile Lahoud, Lebanon’s president since 1998. Lahoud was a patron of 
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Syria and when Syria planned to extend president Lahoud’s six-year term in 2004 for 
three more years, Hariri was strongly opposed to it. Syria extended the presidency which 
caused many different reactions within the political spectrum. Hizbullah was an ally of 
Lahoud and favored the decision. For many Christians and Druze, and allies of Hariri, the 
mood was of resentment. This was another example of Syria’s control in Lebanese 
politics. The result was an international response by the United States and France passing 
UN Security Council Resolution 1559, calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and 
disarming of Hizbullah. 
There were a series of meetings held in 2004 to unite the various political groups 
against Syrian domination. Hariri became the “leader” of opposition to Syria and in 
January 2005 he told Rustum Ghazali. Syria’s pro-consul in Beirut, that Syrian imposed 
candidates would not be accepted on his list for the May 2005 elections.147 On February 
14, 2005 Rafiq al-Hariri was assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut. Although a UN 
investigation to the murder is in progress, there is little doubt that Syria viewed Hariri as 
a threat to their political dominance in Lebanon.148  
Syrian forces withdrew from Lebanon in April 2005. Following the death of 
Hariri there were demonstrations. One was staged by Hizbullah in Beirut on March 8, 
2006. It was estimated that four hundred thousand people attended the demonstration.149 
In response to Hizbullah’s gathering the pro-American democratic Cedar Revolutionaries 
organized a massive rally of their own on March 14 with an estimated one million people 
in attendance, a full quarter of the country’s population. It appeared that neither side 
would win the demonstration war. 
General Michel Aoun, a Maronite and former commander-in-chief of the 
Lebanese army had been in exile in France since 1990 but returned to Lebanon in time 
for the May 2005 Parliamentary elections. While in France, Aoun gained a following 
among the secular Christians and Muslims. He was admired for his courage, honesty, and 
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nationalism.150 Aoun joined forces with Berri and Hizbullah to call for a delay in the 
election in order to revise the electoral law, which had been designed by Syria to select 
friendly pro-Syrian politicians to parliament. Aoun found allies within the pro-Syrian 
“March 8 Group” and when the elections were held, the victors were the anti-Syrian 
coalition. 
Under Saad el-Din al-Hariri, son of the former prime minister, they won seventy-
two seats but it was not enough to unseat the pro-Syrian president Lahoud.151 Amal and 
Hizbullah won thirty-five seats and Aoun won twenty-one seats. In February 2006 Aoun 
and Hizbullah formed a political pact to work together to fight corruption and promote 
electoral and economic reform.152 The pact was significant for Hizbullah because it had 
won recognition as a legitimate part of national resistance. 
3. Prelude to War 
After the withdrawal of Syrian force politicians were urging Hizbullah to disarm. 
The group refused saying the need to defend the country from Israeli invasion was greater 
than ever. Tensions had been escalating for months between Israel and Hizbullah before 
the July 12, 2006 war. In November 2005 Hizbullah tried to capture several Israeli 
soldiers in the border village of Ghajar by the Golan Heights but were not successful.153 
Then in late May 2006 Hizbullah fired on an Israeli border post wounding an Israeli 
soldier.154 Over the years since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, a typical response between 
Hizbullah and Israel would be the Israeli army shelling Hizbullah command and control 
centers.155 However, Israel destroyed many of Hizbullah’s positions along the border. In 
response, Hizbullah launched eight katyusha rockets at Safad, the Israeli army’s northern 
headquarters but ended up hitting a nearby antennae farm instead.156 
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B. JULY 2006 
1. Motives 
On July 12, 2006 Hizbullah militants ambushed an Israeli patrol in an 
unpopulated area of northern Israel bordering Lebanon, capturing two Israeli soldiers and 
killing three others.157 After the Israeli Defense Forces pursued the militants into 
Lebanon, five more soldiers were killed.158 Abductions are a common tactic used by 
Hizbullah for prisoner exchanges with Israel. The prisoners are Lebanese and other 
Arabs. From Hizbullah’s perspective the capture of the Israeli soldiers on the Israeli side 
did not represent a significant change in their strategy since Israel routinely violated the 
Blue Line separating Israel from Lebanon.159 
By July 13 Israel began its offensive against Hizbullah. Lebanon was blockaded 
from the sea and the Beirut airport was hit within a day.160 After Hizbullah’s offices were 
bombed on July 14, Nasrallah released a statement stating Hizbullah was ready for an 
open war and launched an Iranian produced C-802 Noor guided missile that hit the INS 
Hanit, an Israeli naval vessel.161 Israel enjoyed international support while Hizbullah 
attracted condemnation for violating Israeli territory and abducting the soldiers. Key Arab  
states such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates criticized 
Hizbullah. On July 21, 2006 Nasrallah gave an interview on al-Jazeera expressing 
surprise at Arab disapproval and the large scale Israeli response. 
2. Combat 
During the war Israel depended on air power and artillery bombardment from 
northern Israel into Lebanon.162 Israel wanted to isolate Lebanon so it cut off supply 
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routes, struck rocket arsenals, command and control centers and Al-Manar television 
station. Hundreds of targets had been struck across southern Lebanon where the 
population had to flee to safety wherever it could be found. Israel also struck gasoline 
stations and food stores. Hizbullah responded by firing rockets, about one hundred fifty a 
day, into Israel.163 Long range rockets struck Haifa killing eight people. The day after the 
Haifa attack Prime Minister Olmert stated his goals as the return of the two captured 
soldiers, the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south and the elimination of 
Hizbullah as a military force according to UN Security Council Resolution 1559.164 The 
Israelis were confident that they could expunge Hizbullah from Lebanon in half the 
number of days it took the United States in Kosovo.165 
By the end of July it appeared that Israel was over confident in its abilities. Israel 
bombed the city of Qana killing twenty-eight civilians and created widespread public 
outrage and demonstration among the countries in the Middle East.166 Hizbullah proved 
to be very resilient after a month of Israeli bombardment and emerged with support from 
the Shia community. Hizbullah’s base of support increased for several reasons. First, its 
fighters left IOUs for items taken from shops during the war. Second, Hizbullah paid  
$10,000 to $12,000 to people that lost homes. And third, architects and engineers planned 
construction of new home, doctors gave free medicines and thousands of free meals were 
distributed daily.167 
A cease fire was in place in mid-August 2006 when UN Security Council 
Resolution 1701 called for a peacekeeping force (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon to 
oversee an Israeli withdrawal. Although UNIFIL’s task was to insure Lebanese civilians 
were allowed to return and rebuild their villages, they could not take any action to disarm 
Hizbullah without Lebanese government approval. Hizbullah agreed to allow UNIFIL to 
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detain any of its members found carrying arms.168 All in all approximately 500,000 
Israelis were displaced, 900,000 people in Lebanon were evacuated, 43 Israeli and 1,109 
Lebanese civilians had been killed, and 118 Israeli and 28 Lebanese soldiers were killed, 
as well as about 200 Hizbullah fighters.169 Material losses totaled $500 million in Israel, 
$4 billion in Lebanon, 900 factories hit and 1,500 homes damaged or destroyed.170 Israel 
and Lebanon paid a heavy price for the war with no apparent winner. 
3. Hizbullah’s Military Objectives 
A central objective of Hizbullah in the war was to prevent Israel from achieving 
its goals of removing Hizbullah from Lebanon and the release of the two captured 
soldiers. Hizbullah claimed victory in the war because it was able to survive against 
Israel’s vast size and strength. Having outperformed all conventional armies which have 
fought Israel throughout the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Hizbullah prevented an 
Israeli incursion, inflicted losses on the Israeli army and launched rockets into Israel. 
4. Political Objectives 
Politically, Hizbullah wanted to confront Washington’s “New Middle East 
initiative” which sought to remove Hizbullah as well as Hamas because of the U.S. 
government’s framing of the war on terrorism and President Bush’s freedom agenda.171 
Since Bush contended that the war was a struggle between forces of freedom and the 
forces of terror in the Middle East, Hizbullah believed that it was their responsibility to 
thwart the goals of the war.172 The framing of the war became the people’s right to resist 
occupation and the rejection of American imperialistic tendency.173 
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C. MEDIA COVERAGE 
1. Asymmetric Warfare 
During the summertime war, the world of media produced the first really “live” 
war in history.174 Although American networks broadcasted “live” reports along U.S. 
invasion routes during the first Gulf War of 1991 and the second Gulf War of 2003, 
networks in this war projected real time battlefield pictures.175 These included pictures of 
advancing/retreating Israeli troops in southern Lebanon, homes and villages destroyed by 
bombs, people wandering through debris, Israeli airplanes attacking Beirut, and 
Hizbullah rockets striking northern Israel and Haifa.176 Journalists employed cameras, 
computers and video phones to broadcast their reports from any location and as a result, 
these devices became weapons of war. 
In the beginning of the war reporters noted that Hizbullah started the war and 
casualties were the consequence. However, after the first week such references were 
dropped or downplayed. The impression was that Israel was shooting at anything that 
moved because it responded with disproportionate military strength, destroying 
infrastructure and killing civilians.177 Disproportionality was the theme of the war and a 
graphic example of it was shown on television on July 30 when the Israelis bombed the 
village of Qana in southern Lebanon, killing over fifty Lebanese civilians. The Israelis 
said they were firing at a rocket site next to the building and apologized for the loss of 
life, but reporters described the scene as a massacre, bringing more negative attention to 
Israel.178  
2. Content Analysis 
Arab and Western reporters focused on the theme of disproportionate use of force 
from the start of the conflict. Asharq Al-Awsat, an Arabic language newspaper, ran 24 
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photographs of Israeli attacks in Lebanon on the front page but only two of Lebanese 
attacks on Israel. This played to the prejudices of the readers who empathized with their 
Arab brethren under Israeli fire.179 Furthermore, Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya ran stories 
that referred to Israel as the aggressor. Headlines tried to show a more balanced picture 
but were not successful. Arab news organizations provided their own news and 
information but it reflected essentially the same opinion, that Israel was the aggressor. 
American television coverage was heaviest during the first two weeks of the war and it 
was more critical of Israel than of Hizbullah.180 
Another theme covered in the war was the feeling of Arab victimization. 
Television broadcasts focused on Lebanese as the victims. The stories were on death, 
destruction and devastation. Al-Arabiya stressed Lebanese victimization in 95 percent of 
its stories while Al-Jazeera stressed this theme 70 percent of its broadcasts.181 
3. Al-Manar Access 
Media and communications are not separate entities apart from Hizbullah but are 
central to the party. In the first two weeks of the war Al-Manar jumped from number 83 
in the ratings to number eight.182 The station is not interested in being objective or 
balanced. Its goal is to show their agenda and support the military in times of conflict. 
One of the ways Al-Manar increased its viewership was giving reporters access to certain 
areas. Hizbullah conducted a media tour of southern Beirut where homes and apartments 
of Shiite supporters were damaged by air strikes.183 These tours were not only for Al-
Manar reporters, but also foreign correspondents. Hizbullah controlled the tour and 
showed how Israel bombed civilians caused devastation. In southern Lebanon main roads 
had bomb craters and bridges were blown away. 
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Network anchors set up their cameras along the Israeli-Lebanese border to do live 
reports from the battlefield. At night, anchors used special cameras and were in positions 
to observe Israeli tanks and troops preparing to cross the border into Lebanon and to 
report live when the action began.184 Although some journalists complained they were 
not able to gain access to areas they wanted, Hizbullah encouraged them to watch Al-
Manar for the latest reports and information regarding the war.185 
Hizbullah utilized its media during the war and successfully integrated them into 
the battlefield. After bombings Al-Manar correspondents would be in convoys reporting 
the damage. The story would then be framed as journalists being targeted by the Israelis 
because of what they were reporting. Al-Manar played the story as the journalist’s own 
physical survival, especially since Israel bombed the television station within the first few 
days of the war. Anchors were good at not saying personal offenses towards specific 
government officials and projecting the war as a national fight for all Arabs. 
Additionally, Al-Manar was effective in using enemy media for its own purposes. Al-
Manar aired footage of people in Israel expressing doubt about the military action being 
successful. It also suggested that Hizbullah did not really start the war because Israel was 
already planning an attack for September.186 Hizbullah was taking the element of surprise 
away from Israel. Rapid response clips to Israel’s reporting showed visual propaganda 
and were released almost daily. Al-Manar’s propaganda campaign towards Lebanon was 
also highly effective. People shown in clips waved flags that belonged to Hizbullah, 
Amal and Lebanon. There was even a woman wearing a cross. Speeches given by 
Nasrallah showed him calm, stating that Hizbullah was fighting and winning the war of 
resistance.  
Al-Manar focused on Lebanese victims and rarely mentioned its own casualties. 
One photograph that ran on Al-Manar was of a rescue worker holding up the corpse of a 
child whose body was nothing below the flesh.187 Al-Manar rarely showed Hizbullah 
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fighters firing weapons from residential neighborhoods. For Hizbullah, reporting on the 
destruction gave them an advantage because they had reporters already in the area and 
Israel had killed and destroyed much more than Hizbullah. It is unlikely that their 
coverage was an unbiased assessment of the situation on the ground as media portrayal 
plays a strategic role in wars. 
D. POST JULY WAR 
1. Hizbullah in Lebanon 
While after the war there were celebrations of Hizbullah’s victory in the Arab 
world, within Lebanon, it had split the country in two. One side represented Sunnis, 
Druze and Christians (March 14 Coalition) that banded together after the assassination of 
former Sunni Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. This group was in power during the 2006 
war and accused Hizbullah of being an agent of Syria and Iran with the aim of creating an 
Islamic Republic.188 The other side consisted of a majority of the Shia community and a 
large section of the Christian community, especially followers of the former general 
Michel Aoun, a Maronite. They called themselves the March 8 Group in commemoration 
of the large demonstration held by Hizbullah and Amal on March 8, 2005.189 
2. Political Strategy After the War 
Hizbullah rejected blame for precipitating the war with Israel. Hizbullah leaders 
claimed that members of the March 14 coalition had lobbied Israel and the United States 
to launch a war on Hizbullah.190 Additionally, UN Resolution 1701 had provisions that 
were not approved of. Since the March 14 Coalition had Hizbullah’s help in controlling 
the majority of parliamentary seats and made an agreement with Hizbullah, when it did 
not follow the agreement, the government was no longer effective and lost its 
legitimacy.191 Hizbullah believed it was deprived of its legitimate role since the 
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opposition group enjoyed the support of a majority in the country.192 As a result, 
Hizbullah is seeking a greater share of political power in the cabinet.193 Hizbullah feels 
that they are not treated as equal partners. The decision to seek more participation is not 
for themselves or Shiites, but for the inclusion of other major political forces such as the 
Free Patriotic Movement led by Michel Aoun.194 By increasing political power it will 
further the cause of the resistance. Political participation has become a necessity and a 
way to promote national unity. 
3. Military Strategy 
UN Security Council Resolution 1701 ended the hostilities between Israel and 
Lebanon and sent thousands of Lebanese army troops as well as the United Nations 
Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon. Although the Resolution called for the government 
to halt the flow of arms, it did not disarm Hizbullah.195 The government has allowed 
Hizbullah to keep its weapons as long as it is not visually seen. The only change since the 
Resolution was implemented was the removal of a public observation post along the 
border with Israel which Hizbullah claims were of no value militarily.196 To Hizbullah, 
Resolution 1701 does not hinder the resistance. The war was a victory for them and 
demonstrated the effectiveness of unconventional military tactics. The need for Hizbullah 
is greater than the Lebanese army or UNIFIL. 
4. Media Strategy 
Since the 2006 war political imagery (posters and banners) have grown 
substantially in Beirut. After Israel’s bombardment, Hizbullah placed banners labeled 
“Made in the USA” written in English on debris.197 The media was known for its rapid 
deployment of post-war banners and ability to gain international attention. When USAID 
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sponsored a billboard campaign that declared “I Love Life” denouncing Hizbullah for its 
destructive abilities, the opposition countered with an Arabic language campaign stating 
“We want to live” and included “…with dignity” and “…without debt.”198 
In times of no conflict daily broadcasts on Al-Manar begin with news and a 
review of headlines from different papers ranging in ideology.199 American domestic and 
foreign politics are followed closely and programs highlight mistakes the United States 
has made.200 Domestically, Al-Manar stresses Hizbullah ideology and the need for state 
services. There are no sectarian divisions and programs focus on Lebanese unity. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Though Hizbullah emerged from the war with stronger political support 
throughout the Arab public opinion, it has garnered greater opposition among 
governments. It has started to shift from military resistance to Israel to political 
engagement in Lebanon.201 During the war there were numerous stories produced, both 
good and bad. What greatly influenced public opinion was “live” reporting and footage of 
death and destruction. Through Al-Manar, the organization justifies violence against its 
enemies and sustains a culture of resistance.202 For Hizbullah to effectively use the media 
as a tool in warfare, it has shown that the organization has evolved since its formation as 
guerrilla fighters to sophisticated users of information technology. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. RE-EXAMINING SOCIAL MOVEMENT AND THE MEDIA 
As we have seen in Chapter One, social movements are involved in struggles that 
frame problems and injustices in a way that convinces a wide and diverse audience to 
address the issue and influence its outcome.203 A major tool in this process is the media 
which is instrumental in several ways. It reaches the general public to mobilize potential 
participants, it can link movements with other political actors and it provides 
psychological support for members.204 Research has shown that changes in public 
opinion were related to the amount of national television coverage of issues, as well as 
the source of the news.205 Other evidence suggests that an individual’s rating of a 
problem’s important to society may be related more to media coverage than to personal 
experience.206 
Another aspect of social movements is framing. Movement groups use issues that 
put them in a positive light to motivate and legitimate their efforts.207 It is not surprising 
that most movements spend a lot of time in attracting and shaping media coverage of 
their activities. Hizbullah’s use of media was very effective in the summer war. Since it’s 
first broadcast in 1991, Al-Manar’s staying power can be attributed to three factors. 
During the war reporters were drawn to areas under attack because of footage shown 
would attract media attention and support for Hizbullah. These disruptive actions were 
viewed as newsworthy.208 Second, speeches from Nasrallah projecting a calm demeanor 
were successful in attracting sympathetic supporters. Nasrallah framed the conflict as 
protecting the Resistance, maintaining Lebanon’s “Arabism” and keeping Lebanon out of 
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the U.S.-Israeli orbit.209 The party has always been shaped by the interaction between its 
armed activity and external factors such as political and military developments. Third, the 
media has aided their actions. Hizbullah managed to show their humanitarian side by 
giving money to people in the poor areas, rebuilding homes whether damaged by conflict 
or natural disaster, and setting up schools and hospitals. These acts succeeded in 
generating support for Hizbullah because they were providing services that the 
government could not. 
B. ISLAMIST WAR 
From Israel’s creation in 1948 through 1973, rejection of Israel was called pan-
Arab nationalism.210 Arab states formed alliances in the name of unity to wage war 
against Israel. However, the failure to coordinate led to humiliating defeats in the Arab-
Israeli Wars of 1948 and 1967. The Islamist component to the resistance was always 
present against Israel but usually played a supporting role, first to the Arab states then the 
PLO.211 Ayatollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamist revolution in Iran, had a vision of 
Islamism that could deny legitimacy to Israel and defeat it.212 By establishing Hizbullah 
as an armed guard in Lebanon, it was a new Islamist front against Israel. By the late 
1990s Islamist movements began to rise across the Middle East. They started to re-
evaluate their position in order to avoid government repression and to take advantage of 
the growing demand for reform in many countries.213  
Mainstream movements accepted secular forces as legitimate political actors and 
potential allies for democratic reform.214 Islamist organizations have embraced 
democratic politics and have focused on common objectives, such as challenging 
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authoritarian regimes. There are signs of growing Islamist acceptance of non-Islamist 
solutions. However, it is unlikely these organizations will succeed in removing doubts 
about the limits of their tolerance as long as they have both a political and a religious 
agenda.215 
C. THE CHANGING FACE OF HIZBULLAH 
From its beginnings Hizbullah has been more than a political party. With Israel’s 
withdrawal in 2000, and the draw in the latest war, Hizbullah emerged victorious. Since 
then it has sought to define its identity and role in society by shifting its focus and 
priorities. Hizbullah has shifted its public emphasis from liberating certain areas of 
Lebanon like Sheba Farms, to protecting Lebanon and empowering all Arabs against 
Israel.216 The principal agenda claimed by Hizbullah related to the Arab-Israeli conflict 
was to liberate Palestine. Following the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada Hizbullah 
increased its support for armed operations in Israel and the occupied territories.217 
Hizbullah has become embedded in Lebanese society because of its ability to play 
the part of a national political force in a confessional system and its delivery of important 
social services. During times of conflict Al-Manar broadcasts more propaganda and 
support for military action. After the September 11 attacks the station toned down their 
anti-U.S. rhetoric. Al-Manar was created as a non-military means of resistance. However, 
resistance without military action is not possible according to the organization. There is 
some apprehension regarding politics. To become a fully normal political party the 
organization would succumb to Lebanon’s internal squabbling, corruption and patron 
client system.218 Hizbullah views itself as a broad movement that aspires for goals higher 
than local politics. 
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A shifting regional scene and strong international pressure has kept Hizbullah 
busy. Hizbullah has been a movement that has fought for several causes-the struggle for 
Palestine and a national resistance in the south. It is also a struggle between Islamism and 
Arab nationalism on one side and U.S.-Israel domination on the other. Since governments 
have lost credibility and impact in recent decades, Hizbullah’s success in driving out 
Israel will stimulate other like minded movements in the region to follow its 
organizational and political prowess.219 
The war has brought the region closer to a wider conflict. Hizbullah has become 
more independent in recent years both operationally and financially. Iran’s power is also 
growing. The relationship between Iran and the Shia community in Lebanon goes back 
many centuries. After more than two decades of help the once small guerrilla 
organization has transformed into a popular and powerful political force inside Lebanon. 
Hizbullah was not destroyed militarily yet its status as a state within a state did not 
change despite deployment of Lebanese troops in the south. 
Media coverage of events in the Middle East has changed dramatically. What 
does this mean for politics? There could be common Arab consensus on global issues. 
Call in shows and political talk shows have allowed Arabs to interact and discuss issues. 
How far media freedom will continue to grow will depend on how much the political 
power in the Arab world feel threatened by its action.220 Al-Manar represents Hizbullah’s 
position and is constantly trying to acquire legitimacy. Besides Al-Jazeera, Al-Manar is 
the Arab media outlet that has covered a war using its own correspondents and 
resources.221 Al-Manar’s coverage was overwhelmingly a humanitarian perspective. Its 
success and growth have earned it both legitimacy and a confidence to approach conflict 
and war.  
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D. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Though Hizbullah is a strong well-organized movement, it has different agendas 
depending on the circumstances. Hizbullah claims to act in the name of resistance, but 
sometimes it is a party seeking to modify the political rules of politics in Lebanon.222 
Hizbullah’s increasingly confrontational involvement in Lebanese politics has resulted in 
a loss of Sunni support.223 At the same time insistence on keeping its weapons has begun 
to undermine its legitimacy as a political party to many Lebanese.224 Through Al-Manar 
programming is meant to incite violence against Israel and support the Palestinians. As 
long as the Palestinian conflict is an issue, Hizbullah will continue to be a major force in 
the region. This analysis of Hizbullah and its television station demonstrates that the 
organization has evolved according to changes in its environment domestically and 
internationally. It was successful in using its television station as a weapon in war. Since 
Al-Manar cannot be silenced completely future studies need to address ways in which 
there are procedures or motivations for changes in media content.  
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